![]() ![]() September 11, 2001, was a day of unprecedented shock and suffering in the history of the United States.The nation was unprepared. We have come together with a unity of purpose because our nation demands it. Ten Commissioners-five Republicans and five Democrats chosen by elected leaders from our nation’s capital at a time of great partisan division-have come together to present this report without dissent. ![]() We pre se nt the narrative of this report and the recommendations that flow from it to the President of the United States, the United States Congress, and the American people for their consideration. Professional Staff Member & Family Liaison Kojm, Deputy Executive Director Daniel Marcus, General Counsel Joanne M. ![]() Philip Zelikow, Executive Director Christopher A. 413įAA Air Traffic Control Centers Reporting structure, Northeast Air Defense Sector Flight paths and timelines Usama Bin Ladin Map of Afghanistan Khalid Sheikh Mohammed The 9/11 hijackers The World Trade Center Complex as of 9/11 The World Trade Center radio repeater system The World Trade Center North Tower stairwell with deviations The Twin Towers following the impact of American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 The Pentagon after being struck by American Airlines Flight 77 American Airlines Flight 93 crash site, Shanksville, Pennsylvania Unity of effort in managing intelligence ![]() Unity of Effort across the Foreign-Domestic Divide 400 Unity of Effort in the Intelligence Community 407 Unity of Effort in Sharing Information 416 Unity of Effort in the Congress 419 Organizing America’s Defenses in the United States 423Īppendix A: Common Abbreviations 429 Appendix B:Table of Names 431 Appendix C: Commission Hearings 439 Notes 449 HOW TO DO IT? A DIFFERENT WAY OF ORGANIZING THE GOVERNMENT 399 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 Reflecting on a Generational Challenge 361 Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations 365 Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism 374 Protect against and Prepare for Terrorist Attacks 383ġ3. Imagination 339 Policy 348 Capabilities 350 Management 353ġ2. WARTIME 325 10.1 Immediate Responses at Home 326 10.2 Planning for War 330 10.3 “Phase Two” and the Question of Iraq 334ġ1. Preparedness as of September 11 278 Septem285 Emergency Response at the Pentagon 311 Analysis 315ġ0. The Summer of Threat 254 Late Leads-Mihdhar, Moussaoui, and KSM 266ĩ. “THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED” 254 8.1 8.2 The Millennium Crisis 174 Post-Crisis Reflection: Agenda for 2000 182 The Attack on the USS Cole 190 Change and Continuity 198 The New Administration’s Approach 203įirst Arrivals in California 215 The 9/11 Pilots in the United States 223 Assembling the Teams 231 Final Strategies and Tactics 241Ĩ. Terrorist Entrepreneurs 145 The “Planes Operation” 153 The Hamburg Contingent 160 A Money Trail? 169Ħ. AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND 145 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS 108 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5īefore the Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania 108 Crisis: August 1998 115 Diplomacy 121 Covert Action 126 Searching for Fresh Options 134ĥ. and in the State Department and the Defense Department 93. and in the Federal Aviation Administration 82. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES 71 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4įrom the Old Terrorism to the New: The First World Trade Center Bombing 71 Adaptation-and Nonadaptation. THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM 47 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5Ī Declaration of War 47 Bin Ladin’s Appeal in the Islamic World 48 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988–1992) 55 Building an Organization, Declaring War on the United States (1992–1996) 59 Al Qaeda’s Renewal in Afghanistan (1996–1998) 63ģ. Inside the Four Flights 1 Improvising a Homeland Defense 14 National Crisis Management 35Ģ. List of Illustrations and Tables ix Member List xi Staff List xiii–xiv Preface xv 1. ![]()
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